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An Ultrarelzable, Fault-tolerant, Control-System (UFTCS) concept IS descnbed usmg a systems desIgn 
phIlosophy whIch allows development of system structures contammg virtually no common elements. 
Common elements lzmlt achIevable system relzablllty and can cause catastroph,c loss of fault-tolerant system 
functIOn The UFTCS concept prol'ldes the means for removmg common system elements by perrmttmg 
the elements of the system to operate as mdependent, uncoupled entItIes MultIple versIOns of the 
app/zcatlOn program are run on d,ss,m,lar hardware Fault tolerance IS achIeved through the use of statIc 
redundancy management 
INTRODUCTION 
The use of redundant concepts enables fault-tolerant 
systems to be developed which are signIficantly more relIable 
than theIr slillplex counterparts Unfortunately, no system 
can be developed which can be shown to be entIrely free 
from desIgn error Latent desIgn faults which eXist m system 
functIOns which are held In common between redundant 
elements WIll ultImately cause system faIlure The advent of a 
system failure caused by a common latent design fault repre-
sents an unpredlcted event In the lIfe of any fault-tolerant 
system The first attempt to launch the Space Shuttle 
Columbia was aborted as a result of a latent deSign fault In 
a common system feature, namely, the computer synchronI-
zatIOn scheme Fortunately, the failure was not catastrophIc 
However, It was costly In terms of financial loss, schedule 
delay, and prestIge 
Fault-tolerant systems which do not contaIn features 
common to redundant elements are mherently morl! relIable 
than system deSigns which do contaIn common features The 
effect of common elements on fault-tolerant performance 
generally are not conSidered when the relIability of a gIVen 
system IS calculated The difference between concepts con-
tammg common elements and those not contaInIng common 
elements Will become apparent when the relIabilIty of the 
operatIOnal system IS assessed 
Common features are not reqUIred In systems where the 
redundant elements operate Independently These features 
prolIferate In fault-tolerant systems concepts whIch are 
popular today and can be generally categonzed as (1) use of 
global redundancy management schemes, (2) use of redun-
dancy synchronIZatIOn, (3) cross-channel commUnICatIOn 
between redundant elements, (4) replIcatIon of IdentIcal 
hardware, and (5) replIcatIOn of Identical applIcation 
programs 
PROJECT HISTORY 
The postulate that UFTCS systems could be developed 
from completely mdependent elements came from research 
begun In the mld-1970s at NASA Ames Research Center 
Dunn and Meyer recognized that Significant Increases In the 
computatIOnal power of microelectrOnIcs, coupled With 
Slillilar decreases In theIr cost, Size, and weight would permit 
the development of ultrarellable fault-tolerant system deSigns 
(ref 1) They developed a system structure which uses an 
effiCient blend of hardware and software to achieve fault 
tolerance based upon Independent redundant elements The 
resultIng UFTCS system concept consisted of asymptotI-
cally stable Independent control elements In a parallel, 
cross-strapped system enVIronment Fault tolerance was 
achieved through the use of statIc redundancy management 
(ref 2) 
StatIc-redundancy management IS modeled after bIOlogi-
cal systems whIch compensate for contmuous failure Without 
any global fault-handlmg mechanism ThiS method of 
accommodatmg the failures expenenced In IndlVldual redun-
dant elements was prevIOusly ImpractIcal because of the 
enormous penalties of cost, Size, weight, and power Incurred 
In N-module (replIcated) redundant systems Because of thIs, 
the SIFT (ref 3) and FTMP (ref 4) fault-tolerant programs 
concentrated on hardware-conservatIon techniques based on 
dynamiC redundancy management Both trade off hardware 
size for software and general system compleXity The current 
computational power available m today's rrucroelectronIc 
technology makes pOSSible the use of N-module, statIc 
redundancy In fault-tolerant system concepts 
USIng the ongmal work as a baSIS, the authors have 
developed laboratory facilitIes, Simulators, and an operatmg 
expenmental test bed capable of exammlllg the fundamentals 
of the theoretical work The laboratory has the capacity to 
syntheSize and analyze ultra-relIable fault-tolerant systems 
concepts The experImental test bed proVides a real-time 
lillplementatIOn of a UH-IH helIcopter control system and 
IS used to examme the charactenstIcs of Independently 
operated fault-tolerant elements It conSIsts of autonomous 
elements configured to operate Independently, m parallel, 
and can be arranged m quadruple, tnple, or dual-redundant 
configuratIons The UH-IH control algonthm Implemented 
IS asymptotIcally stable (refs 5 and 6) 
An ultrarelIable fault-tolerant control system (UFTCS) IS 
one WhIch, possessmg VIrtually no common elements, wIll 
delIver ItS theoretIcal relIabIlIty ThIs report desenbes the 
development of a desIgn phIlosophy from WhICh uitrarellable 
fault-tolerant control systems (UFTCS) can be generated 
The basIs for the concept employs the use of mdependent, 
uncoupled redundant elements to elnrunate the need for 
common elements m the system structure A properly 
configured UFTCS system wIll have the followmg charac-
tenstIcs and attnbutes (1) a structure that IS relatIvely free 
of common elements, (2) probabIlIty of faIlure less than 
10-13 fhr m the helIcopter envIronment, (3) sUfVIvabIlIty 
from externally motIvated phYSICal damage caused by 
the dIsperSIOn capaCIty of the redundant elements, 
(4) mdependent operatIOn of control tasks and redundant 
elements, (5) autonomous, nomdentIcal elements, (6) statIc, 
nonreconfigurmg local fault management, (7) task replIcatIOn 
and votmg processes WhICh are transparent to the applIcatIOn 
desIgner 
The theoretIcal and expenmental objectIve of our work IS 
to proVIde proof that fault-tolerant systems based upon 
mdependent operatIOn of redundant elements are a practIcal 
alternatIve for fault-tolerant system desIgns To thIS end, 
laboratory SImulatIOns were developed whIch allowed mvestI-
gatIon of the responses of vanous control-system structures 
m the fault-tolerant enVIronment, and the structunng and 
analYSIS of redundant data-management (votmg) schemes A 
typICal example of a UFTCS was constructed, usmg the 
archItecture proposed by Dunn and Meyer (ref. 1), to allow 
mvestIgatIons mto the theoretIcal and practIcal bases of the 
concept m conjunctIon WIth the operatIonal hardware and 
software The control system nnplemented m thIS expen-
mental test bed was that of a UH-IH helIcopter Some results 
of the expenmental research are presented whIch establIsh an 
empmcal baSIS mdicatIng that uitrarellable systems whIch 
employ mdependent, uncoupled-redundant elements can 
be produced 
ULTRARELIABLE CONCEPTS 
UltrarelIable Fault Tolerance - A Deflllttion 
UltrarelIabIlIty can be achIeved m a fault-tolerant system 
by elIrrunatmg the potentIal of system faIlure caused by 
latent deSIgn errors whIch eXist III functIOns held "m 
common" among the redundant elements As no system 
deSIgn can be shown to be completely free of latent desIgn 
error, these latent faults can be assumed to eXist m fault-
tolerant systems whIch contalll common features RelIabilIty 
analyses of fault-tolerant systems do not account for the 
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presence of the latent deSIgn error (some general work has, 
however, been accomplIshed m thIS area (ref 7» Therefore, 
the demonstrable relIabilIty of a fault-tolerant system WhICh 
contams common faIlure modes Will be less than the calcu-
lated relIabIlIty because of the presence of latent deSIgn 
faults WhICh eXist m any common features However, fault-
tolerant systems WhICh con tam VIrtually no common 
elements can be structured These systems are predIcated on 
the concept that the redundant elements must eXist as mde-
pendent, autonomous entItIes UltrarelIable fault tolerance 
can be defined as "a concept WhICh produces ultrarelIable 
systems that have the capabIlIty of delIvenng expected 
relIabIlIty" Because of the SimplIcIty of the desIgns whIch 
evolve from the concept, these systems are extremely relIable 
WIth probabIlItIes of faIlure less than 10-1 3 fhr of operatIOn 
m enVIronments as adverse as the helIcopter enVIronment 
UltrarelIable Fault Tolerance - The Cnteria 
Hlstoncally, the development of fault-tolerant systems has 
been motIvated by the perSIstent need of the user for ever-
mcreasmg system relIabIlIty Numerous fault-tolerant system 
concepts have been developed to satIsfy thIs need Each 
fault-tolerant structure IS constructed attemptmg to satIsfy 
two baSIC cntena 
(1) the redundant system elements must be mdependent, 
(2) the redundantly generated outputs must be 
unambIguous 
It IS the relatIve complIance WIth these two cntena WhICh 
determmes the mherent relIabIlIty of a gIven fault-tolerant 
structure In the past, It has not been pOSSIble to comply 
completely With both cntena for reasons whIch are discussed 
later Usually, a satIsfactory compromIse between complI-
ance and system structure WIll be reached WhICh satIsfies the 
second entenon, but only partIally satIsfies the first 
On mitIal conSIderatIOn, It appears that these two cntena 
are mutually exclUSIVe The first condItIon establIshes that 
the redundant elements must be mdependent and totally 
autonomous WIth no common features But the second 
cntenon reqUIres that the outputs produced by the mdepen-
dent redundant elements cannot be ambIguous For functIOn-
mg elements, the output values whIch are generated must be 
close enough m value throughout tIme so that logIcal com-
pansons can be made These compansons are performed by a 
portIOn of the system, usually known as the "voter," whIch 
IS responSIble for determmmg the faIlure status of the redun-
dant elements 
Independent Elements - A Hlstoncal Perspective 
It would seem that mdependent elements executmg, for 
example, a flIght-control algonthm would not produce 
control values whIch could be logIcally voted for any length 
of hme Under certam condltlons, this has been expenmen-
tally shown to be the case The ongmal system architecture 
of the AFTI-FI6 tnplex, fault-tolerant system was structured 
such that the elements were mdependent However, tests of 
the system, as descnbed by Mackall (ref 8) disclosed signifi-
cant differences between redundantly generated control 
values The magnitude and unpredictability of the discrep-
anCies made channel selectIOn and fault detectIOn Virtually 
Impossible In attemptmg to comply with the first fault-
tolerant cntenon, It became Impossible to fulfill the second 
Steps to correct the problem were Implemented A second 
case, descnbed by Osder (ref 9) disclosed the results 
obtamed from expenmental hardware-m-the-Ioop simulatIOns 
of tnjquadraplex fault-tolerant systems employmg mdepen-
dent elements As With the AFTI-FI6 control-system expe-
nence, Significant differences eXlstmg between mdependently 
generated redundant data were recorded and a method was 
deVised to correct for the differences It IS mterestmg to note 
that both systems solved the divergence problem by Imple-
mentmg a form of cross-channel commUnicatIOn to force the 
control values generated to conform to each other The first 
used equalizatIOn to balance the mtegratlOn terms directly 
m each control law processor thus bnngmg the generated 
redundant values mto accord The second system used equali-
zatIOn to obViate differences m the values generated by each 
control law processor Regardless of the technique employed, 
the mtent of cross-channel commumcation between the 
redundant elements IS the same Osder (ref 9) properly 
descnbes the need "to correct stahc or long-term differences 
(between the control law processors) so that the channels 
track 
However, the use of cross-channel commumcatlOns to 
force the generatlon of votable, redundant, output sets 
VIOlates the first premise upon which ultrareliable concepts 
are based The system elements must be mdependent Cross-
channel commumcatlOns are needed only If static or long-
term differences between redundant elements eXist Both 
reqUirements for the development of ultrareliable fault-
tolerant systems are met by a systems concept which con-
tams mdependent elements whose outputs do not produce 
long-term differences In the next sectIOn, the mechanism 
through which these differences are produced IS demon-
strated Several slffiple techmques which may be employed to 
cause long-term differences between redundant element out-
puts to effectIVely disappear Without resort to cross-channel 
commumcation IS then displayed m a later sectIOn 
Sources of Common Elements 
The generation of fault-tolerant system concepts based 
upon mdependent elements reqUires the ImplementatIOn of 
certam philosophies which mamtam the mdependent rela-
tIOnship By speclfymg that the redundant elements must be 
Independent, systems are produced which are common-
element free Common elements can reSide not only m the 
hardware, but also m the application programs that are 
embedded m the hardware and m the philosophies mvolvmg 
redundancy management All three areas of the system struc-
ture contam the human element The sources of common-
ality m fault-tolerant systems are (1) use of global redun-
dancy management schemes, (2) use of redundancy syn-
chronizatIOn, (3) cross-channel commumcation between 
redundant elements, (4) replicatIOn of Identical hardware, 
and (5) replicatIOn of Identlcal applicatIOn programs 
Common-Element-Free Concepts 
Unsynchronzzed operatlOn- The need for tight syn-
chronization of the redundant elements IS predicated on the 
requirement that the output values generated by these 
elements be votable SynchronizatIOn, m conjunction With 
cross-communication of the mput state vanables, IS used to 
force the redundant elements to march m lockstep, trans-
ducmg mput state vanables at the same time and provldmg 
computed outputs for votmg simultaneously Synchronlza-
hon IS used because It forces the redundant channel outputs 
to track, thereby makmg the votmg process Simple Thus, 
synchrOnizatIOn fulfills the cntenon that the generated out-
puts must be unambiguous However, a synchronized fault-
tolerant system VIOlates the cntenon that the redundant 
elements must be mdependent Because of thiS, the syn-
chromzed system cannot fulml projected reliability as the 
synchromzatlOn scheme (hardware, software, and human 
element) represent an un calculated common element m 
which a latent fault Will cause total loss of system functlon 
Further, synchromzed systems tend to con tam other sources 
of common elements such as the use of cross-channel com-
mumcatlons, Identical hardware, and Identical applicatIOn 
programs To make the resultmg system more rellable, 
unsynchromzed redundant elements should be used 
MultIple-verSIOn redundant elements- The same reasonmg 
can be mvoked to diSCUSS the use of (I) Identical hardware, 
(2) Identical applicatIOn programs, and (3) cross-channel 
commumcatlon All three methods of lffiplementmg redun-
dancy Violate the mdependence cntenon The human 
element IS mvolved With the development of each They can, 
therefore, contam latent faults embedded mto the deSign as a 
result of human error which, when disclosed, could lead to 
catastrophiC loss of system functIOn The use of cross-
channel commumcatlOn IS unnecessary If the outputs pro-
duced are unambiguous The use of Identical hardware and 
application programs should be supplanted With the use of 
diSSimilar redundancy for each Item The votmg techmques 
Implemented need not be Identical Different votmg philoso-
phies may be used 
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StatIc redundancy management- Independent operatIOn 
of system elements obvIates the use of the global or dynamIc 
forms of redundancy management The phIlosophy of statIc 
redundancy management IS employed mstead StatIc redun-
dancy management eltmmates the mterelement couplmg 
found m fault-tolerant systems whIch employ dynamIc or 
analytIc redundancy management The statIc method of 
redundancy management may best be descnbed as manage-
ment where Nothmg of system wIde sIgmficance occurs to 
the system structure on the advent and detectIon of elemental 
faIlure 
StatIc redundancy management ellmmates the need for 
global redundancy managers performmg dynamIc reconfigu-
ratIon of the system StatIcally managed systems do not have 
the common element represented by the global management 
scheme and are therefore more relIable Moreover, statIc 
redundancy management does not requue system-wIde 
knowledge of how the system can fall, global knowledge of 
the current fault status of the system, or development of 
any system-wIde reconfiguratlOn strategy The statIc-fault 
managers ("voters") are autonomous entItIes whtch neIther 
share fault status nor cause any external actlVlty when faIlure 
of system elements are detected BasIcally, It IS the functIon 
of the voter to control the flow of redundantly generated 
A AND B ARE TASKS 









data from "Task A" to "Task B" as shown m figure 1 Each 
redundant task member has ItS own autonomous voter Each 
voter receIves mdependently generated, redundant data from 
each member of the prevIOus task Here the mcommg data 
sets are correlated and only uncorrupted data reach tlte 
task. 
Software development and valIdatIon m fault-tolerant 
systems whtch are statIcally managed IS hIghly modular The 
control process IS dlstnbuted mto several tasks Each task 
may be buIlt as a separate entIty and lInked mto the whole 
through proper defmltIon of the data flow between tasks 
As data arnvmg at any task have been evaluated for correct-
ness by the voter, the applIcatIons programmer does not 
have to deal WIth the techmcalItIes of redundant-data 
mampulatlOn The task applIcatIOn programs are developed 
separately from the programs mvolvmg the votmg process m 
a statIcally managed system 
In conclusIOn, fault-tolerant systems employmg mdepen-
dently redundant elements controlled through statIc redun-
dancy management and whose system elements perform 
dIfferent versIOns of the applIcatIOn programs (both process 
and redundancy management) m dIssImIlar hardware are 











FIgure 1 - StatIc redundancy management usmg mdependent elements 
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Sources of Channel Divergence 
UltrarelIable systems can only be generated If the ele-
ments which perform redundant processes are functIOnally 
Independent and the outputs they produce are unambiguous 
However, the system design practIces which have currently 
attamed mdustry-wlde acceptance do not allow for Indepen-
dent operatIOn of the redundant elements The need to 
produce unambiguous results has led Industry to develop 
methods which obVIate the sources of "channel divergence" 
These methods also cause the redundant elements to become 
highly coupled and dependent It IS clear that other methods 
need to be found which allow for both unambiguous output 
and mdependent elements But It IS first necessary to fully 
understand the ongms of channel divergence and the effect 
that each source has upon the magmtude of the divergence 
between channels One Important vanatlOn In plulosophy 
will be mtroduced which takes the cntenon of unambiguous 
results lIterally In the fault-tolerant system, It IS not neces-
sary that the agreement between results, as deterrruned by 
the system votIng elements, be perfect It IS only necessary 
that the results not be ambiguous It IS acceptable to relax 
the votIng cntena to one which, for example, Will tolerate 
long-term (10+ sec) channel differences of 1% full scale, and 
short-term differences (300 ms) of 3% or 4% of full scale 
ThiS relaxatIOn has httle or no effect on field relIabIhty 
VanatlOn between personal clocks- As shown In figure 2, 
each redundant computer contams a source of "personal 
time" The base of thiS tIme IS usually a crystal-controlled 
osculator withm each computer It IS a practIcal Impos-
sIbIhty that the relative passage of personal time noted by 
Computer I Will be Identical to that noted by Computer 2 
or Computer N at any mstant With all other factors equal, 
results of computed functIons which are based on personal 
time Will vary from computer to computer DlgltalIntegra-
tlOn IS a process affected by the computer's perceptIOn of 
tIme Time differences between computers appear as If the 
constant of mtegratlOn IS vaned between the N computers 
For processes which are cychc (roll or pitch control, etc ), 
the divergence between results peaks when the cycle peaks 
and returns to zero when the cycle returns to ItS null pomt. 
Channel divergence does not accumulate, and can be made 
small through proper specificatIOn of the time accuracy 
between redundant computers For mtegratlOn processes 
which are not cychc, such as are found m naVIgatIOn, the 
perceived differences ill time accululate Given suffiCIent 
time, channel divergence (caused by vanous channels wantIng 
to be In different places at the same mstant of real time) Will 
grow untu channel faIlure IS declared by the voter If rrusslOn 
tIme IS short compared to the mtercomputer tIme dnft rate, 
thIs effect can be Ignored If rrusslOn times are long, such as 
In autonavlgatlOn spacefught, thiS vanatlOn must be taken 
mto account 
Personal clock maccuraCles- The personal clocks shown 
m figure 2 not only vary relatIve to each other, but dnft 
relatIve to the value of real tIme If the apphcatIon program 
presumes a knowledge of real tIme (e g, a Euler first-order 
IntegratIOn used for navigatIOn purposes) and the real tIme 
differs from presumed tune, output vanatlOns from proper 
outputs (those generated If the presumed tune were equal to 
real tIme) occur from the POInt of VIew of the system As 
above, IntegratIOn errors caused by cyclIc operatIOn of the 
system return to zero when the system returns to ItS Initial 
conditIon, and noncyclIc errors accumulate 
BiaS, scale, and nonlmear factor vanatlOns- The samplIng 
Interfaces shown In figure 2 are replIcated and Independent 
As phYSical deVices, It IS not pOSSible to produce N samplers 
With IdentIcal propertIes Therefore, even If the state vanable 
set was transduced at exactly the same moment m real 
hme, It can be assumed that each Independent computer Will 
subsequently not contaIn exactly Identical dIgItal values for 
each of the vanables The differences appear as bias, scale, 
and nonlInear vanatIons In the sampled mput data sets from 
computer to computer When the applIcatIOn program 
operates on different data, different results Will be recorded 
by the voter When the control law contaInS free mtegrators, 
the effect IS pronounced as the effect IS summed from cycle 
to cycle 
Samplmg skew and samplmg rate- These two related 
parameters have the most pronounced effect on the channel 
divergence State vanable dynamICs, samplIng rates (the data 
are processed between samples), and varyIng sample skews 
WIll combme to produce SituatIOns where the channel diver-
gence vanes m what would seem a random manner However, 
If all of the system vanables were known, the process IS actu-
ally deterrrumstIc A sunple tImmg diagram, figure 3, displays 
a pOSSible relatIonship of the N mdependent computers 
shown m figure 2 Note that m mdependently operated 
redundant elements, both the sample skew and sample rate 
may vary WIth time 
If redundant processes do not sample dynamIc-state 
vanables at the same mstant of real tIme, vanatlOns between 
redundantly computed outputs WIll be recorded by the 
voter SamplIng skew IS the difference m time between Input 
state vanable samples taken by one redundant computer 
relative to the sample time of any other The sample skew 
relationship can be fixed or can vary as a functIOn of the 
loop time of the apphcatIon program Presume, for example, 
that Computer 1 and Computer N have exactly the same real 
time samplIng rate (say 20 ms) and are Identical m all other 
ways except that Computer N always samples data 9 3 ms 
after Computer 1 As the value of the Input data IS changmg 
from mstant to Instant, Computer N Will "see" different 
values for sampled vanables than WIll Computer 1 If a 
particular parameter IS mcreasmg m value, then Computer N 
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will see a larger value than Will Computer 1 As the output of 
the computational process IS based upon the value of the 
Input parameters, the redundant computers must produce 
output values which are different The mstantaneous amount 
of channel divergence recorded at the voter IS dependent 
upon the absolute difference of the vanable value between 
the time It IS evaluated by Computer 1 and Computer N 
(how fast the parameter IS movmg), and how the parameter IS 
used by the control law 
Two factors dealmg With samplmg rates affect channel 
divergence the absolute real-time sample rate and the relative 
samplmg rate of one computer to another The fIrSt factor, m 
conjunctIOn With samplmg skew, determmes the absolute 
difference between the value sampled by Computer 1 and the 
value sampled by Computer N for state vanables WhICh are 
dynamiC For a given vanable dynanucs and samplmg skew, 
mcreasmg the samplmg rate for all of the redundent compu-
ters WIll cause the absolute value dIfference between samples 
to decrease. Regardless of mter-computer skew, the amount 
of channel dIvergence decreases as samplmg rate mcreases 
If the redundant channels have dIfferent or dynanuc (e g , 
data dnven programs) sample rates, the samplmg skew of 
Computer 1 to Computer N WIll vary WIth time The closer 
the times are to each other, the slower the skew vanes ThiS 
can affect channel divergence by causmg the relatIOnshIp of 
the redundant channels to change WIth mcreasmg time 
Dependmg on the dynamiCs of the sampled data, thIS can 
either mcrease or decrease channel divergence 
Use of free mtegrators- "Integral Control" IS an extremely 
useful tool to the control systems deSIgner Its mam use IS to 
control long-term vanatlOns m or compensate for mcomplete 
definItIOn of the state of the plant bemg controlled It pro-
VIdes zero-error, steady-state control of the plant Integrators 
also con tam the sum of all past events occurrmg at the mput 
to the mtegratlOn process If the control laws processed by 
the redundant computers of figure 2 contam free mtegrators, 
then the samplmg, skew and personal time dIfferences WIll 
cause the output values produced by the mtegrators to vary 
effectively m a random fashIOn For mstantaneous mput 
dIfferences, the same may be saId for lead/lag or constant-
gam CirCUitS The dIfference WIth the pure mtegrators IS that 
when the mput dIfference goes to zero, the dIfference 
between the mtegrator outputs WIll not The mtegrator WIll 
"remember" the past hIstory and mamtam the dIfference 
mdefinItely GIven that the process of channel dIVergence 
OWIng to mtegratIOn IS effectively a random one, scenanos 
can be easily constructed wherem the mtegrators cause the 
channel dIvergence to mcrease to mdefinItely large values 
Lead/lag and constant-gam elements do not contnbute to 
long-term or steady state channel dIvergence 
NULLIFYING CHANNEL DIVERGENCE -
A METHODOLOGY 
The factors WhICh cause channel dIvergence are a functIOn 
of the practical constramts m producmg redundant (replI-
cated) elements, and the skew/samplIng relatIOnshIp between 
them These mvolve the method of mput data collectIOn of 
each redundant member In cyclmg through the transfer 
functIOn, WhICh must be Identical from redundant computer 
to redundant computer, output values are produced WhICh 
are predIcated on the sampled value of the mput At any 
gIven mstant, the redundant values produced by mdepen-
dently operated redundancy will be dIfferent To produce 
unambIguous results, the trackmg error must be kept Withm 
acceptable lImIts UnambIguous means, for example, that the 
channels track to wlthm 1 % of full scale on average and the 
mstantaneous vanatlOns cannot exceed 4% of full scale 
Also the time to declare a fault can be extended from one or 
two frames to several seconds of dIsagreement Nothmg IS 
lost through relaxation of the faIlure-detectIOn parameters 
The fault-tolerant structure WIll not propagate Improper or 
faulty data What IS gamed IS a relaxed failure cntenon whIch 
permIts the fault-tolerant system deSIgner to employ deSign 
technIques that do not reqUire common elements m the 
system structure As the results do not have to agree exactly, 
dIfferent applIcation programs, different votmg routmes, 
diSSimilar hardware, and Independent redundant elements 
may be employed Common latent deSign faults WIll not then 
eXIst If the concept of statIc redundancy management IS 
also used 
Use of Asymptotically Stable Controllers 
The dIfferences whIch are Inherent between mdepen-
dently operated redundant computers cannot be allowed to 
cause channel divergence WhICh exceeds a reasonably small 
time/magnItude threshold at the voter The threshold need 
not be statiC, but can be vaned as a functIOn of the dynamiCS 
of the voted vanables Instantaneous dIfferences caused by 
the mechanICS of data samplmg and time generatIOn can be 
minInuzed by speclfymg suffiCIently tight tolerance on the 
hardware that constitutes these functions ThiS speCIfication 
IS the one Item over WhIch the deSigner has good control 
Free, pure mtegratlOn terms cannot be allowed m the control 
system deSign However, the mtegratIon terms can be 
approXImated by lead/lag elements WIth long time constants 
What IS lost IS the steady state zero trackmg error feature of 
control loops whIch employ free mtegrators What IS gamed 
IS that the lead/lag element WIll "forget" the short-term 
differences between redundant channels Instantaneous dIf-
ferences wIll still eXist, but their effects on channel output 
Will be reduced to zero as time passes 
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A laboratory sImulator has been developed whIch provIdes 
mSIght mto the mechamcs of the mdependently operated 
fault-tolerant processes It IS a computer model of a dual-
redundant, fault-tolerant system Redundant-element cycle 
ttmes, mittal skews, control-system parameters, and more 
may be vaned by the operator The stmulator outputs as an 
x-y plot the current state of the mput (Input) and plant 
(System Output), the values produced by the redundant 
control elements (Output A, Output B) and the dIfference 
between the outputs of the two elements (Error A-B) versus 
tIme mto each run Currently, only two SImple votmg 
algonthms have been modeled (1) Voter Output equals 
Channel A Output, and (2) Voter Output equals the average 
of the current values of Channel A and Channel B outputs. 
Two models of a SImple redundant control system run 
on the SImulator are dIsplayed m figure 4 The plant bemg 
controlled m thts example IS represented by a I/S+ 1 term 
A vanety of waveforms may be mput to the system. The 
control system IS bUIlt as a umty-gam feedback system wIth 
two redundant controllers and one voter Each controller 
conSIsts of two control elements m the forward loop - the 
first a SImple constant gam term The second may be a free-
mtegratlOn term (lIS) or a lag term (l/S+e) as determmed by 
the operator Plots of system responses to varymg parameters 
of loop tImes, skews, votmg algonthms, and mput wave 
shapes were made The performance of the control elements 
usmg free mtegrators IS compared to the performance of the 
control elements WhICh use lag elements (note that thIS 
controller IS asymptottcally stable) In the asymptotIcally 
stable control system, channel dIvergence whtch results 
from the redundant channels respondmg to dIfferent mput 
data WIll dIsappear wIth the passage of ttme However, a pnce 
must be paId for the tmprovement m performance. The 
steady state error IS not zero TYPIcal values for KO, Kl, 
and E are, respectIvely, 21,02, and 001 or 28,40, and 
o 1 Thts WIll leave the system WIth a 0 5% to 2 0% steady-
state error Thts steady-state error IS suffiCIently small that It 
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IS wlthm the overall accuracy of most flIght systems AddI-
ttonally, new control system deSIgns can be structured to 
compensate for the error 
Plots are presented to show the response of the two types 
of control systems to vanous mputs These plots demonstrate 
the effect whtch sample skew and sample rate, and bIas, 
scale, and nonlmeantles of the samplmg mterface have on 
channel dIvergence The response of the mtegral control 
system to a step mput IS shown m figure 5 The votmg 
phtlosophy adopted here IS "choose Channel A " Channel A 
sees the step first and produces an output for the plant 
The state value for the plant, whtch has started to move, 
decreases the magmtude of the error sIgnal seen by Chan-
nel B when It samples the vanable 20 ms later Because 
Channel B always samples 20 ms after Channel A (then 
clocks are htghly accurate and are runnmg the same apphca-
tton program), Channel B conSIstently sees smaller values for 
the error sIgnal durmg most of the tranSIent response tIme 
When the system has achteved ItS steady state, a constant 
channel dIvergence of about 15% of the step SIze has been 
mtroduced mto the system At 10 0123 sec, the value of the 
mput IS returned to zero The relatIonshtp of sample ttme to 
system dynamICS IS tmportant. If the mput m figure 5 had 
been returned to zero at exactly 10 000 sec, the steady state 
channel dIvergence generated by the step mput would go to 
zero However, usmg the scenano of figure 6, brmgmg the 
mput back to zero causes an mcrease m the steady-state 
channel dIvergence to 30% of the amplItude of the ongmal 
step NotIce that the system has returned to ItS ongmal null 
state, but the output values of the redundant channels have 
become htghly dIvergent The steady-state channel dIver-
gence IS due solely to the presence of the mtegrator term 
(4 O/S) "remembenng" the dIfferent sequence of mput 
events as seen by each channel 
Now, compare the response of figure 5 to that of figure 6 
Exactly the same condItIons and sequence of events were 
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Figure 5 - Integral system (fig 4) step response 
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Figure 6 - Asymptotlc controller step response (fig 5) 
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been replaced by a (4 OIS + 0 1) term The response of tlus 
term IS slIghtly slower than that of the Integrator, and the 
steady-state gaIn has decreased from Infimty to 400 - but 
notIce the sIgmficant effect thIS slIght modIficatIon to the 
IntegratIOn term has made The channel dIvergence generated 
by tlte asymptotIcally stable controller at TIme = 0 0+ IS 
much less than that generated by the Integral control system 
Further, the channel dIvergence decays to zero as Channel B 
"forgets" the different sequence of Input events and begInS 
to operate solely on the currently available InformatIon The 
response of the plant (system output) to the two controllers 
(Integral versus asymptotic) IS vIrtually IndistInguishable At 
20 0 sec, the asymptotIcally stable redundant controllers have 
reduced the channel dIvergence to 00% of the value of the 
step (versus 30% for the Integral control system). The voter 
must tolerate Instantaneous channel dIvergence wluch may 
be very large (three umts for the first 20 ms after the advent 
of the step In figure 6) The average channel dIvergence for 
30 
asymptotIcally stable redundant controllers, however, can be 
made very small 
Figure 7 shows the response of the asymptotIc system to 
nOIse Impulses of umt amplitude Tlus amplitude could repre-
sent sensor nOIse wIth magmtude equal to one or two bItS of 
dIgItal resolutIOn The sample tImes for the two channels was 
set at 50 ms With Channel B sampling 20 ms later than 
Channel A The SImulatIOn was run such that only Channel A 
sampled the nOIse Impulses, WhICh occurred every 500 ms 
The votIng philosophy employed was "Choose A "The chan-
nel dIvergence, WhICh was zero at the start of the sunulatIon 
has reached a lirmt of about 0 8 umt, or less than the SIze of 
the nOIse Impulses The channel dIvergence of tlte Integral 
system (not shown) Increases by 001 umt at each Impulse 
The SIze of the Integral channel dIvergence would eventually 
tnp the failure threshold of even the most relaxed voter 
FIgure 7 demonstrates that even If the Impulse dIfferences 
enter the asymptotIcally stable, fault-tolerant system faster 
KO = 2.1 
Kl = 0.2 
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Figure 7 - AsymptotIc controller-unpulse-nOIse response 
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than the asymptotIc stablhty can wash them out, the channel 
dIvergence wIll reach a hmlt and wIll not grow wIthout bound 
Notice that an "mtelligent" voter could successfully deter-
mme that neIther channel has failed As the channel dIver-
gence IS constant, the mtelligent voter could deduce that the 
wave shape of the redundant channels must be Identical and 
logIcally assume that neIther channel IS moperative or failed 
Instantaneous change m the channel dIvergence IS agam 
excepted Note that even If the channels were totally syn-
chronous, the channel dIvergence caused by the vanatlOn m 
samphng mterfaces cannot be aVOlded wIthout cross com-
mumcatlOn of the mput data, which thus destroys channel 
mdependence 
Increase Samphng Rate 
As stated earlier, the channel dIvergence WhICh can be 
expected from mdependently operated redundant elements IS 
heavily dependent upon the dynarmcs of the mput relative to 
the samplmg rates of the redundant elements If the samples 
are not taken concurrently This IS brought forth m figure 8 
and figure 9 In the former, the samplmg rate of both redun-
dant elements IS 50 ms wIth Channel B's samphng tune 
skewed 20 ms after Channel A The voter algonthm IS 
"Choose A " A smusOldal mput IS mJected mto the system 
The dynarmcs of the mput and plant are suffiCIent to cause 
the channel dIvergence to oscillate about zero wIth a peak 
magmtude of about 0 25 umt Notice that as the rate of 
change of the mput decreases, the value of the channel dIver-
gence decreases thus clearly demonstratmg the sensltlVlty of 
channel dIvergence to mput dynarmcs The slmulatlOn shown 
m figure 9 IS eqUivalent to that of figure 8 except the samphng 
penod of the redundant elements has been decreased to 
10 ms Notice that decreasmg the samplmg penod to 10 ms 
decreased the channel dIvergence to 20% of ItS ongmal value 
ThIS demonstrates that the channel dIvergence IS also 
senSItive to the samplmg rate 
Control Tune 
The time at WhICh state vanables are sampled IS of utmost 
Importance to the amount of channel dIvergence which WIll 
be expenenced To a lesser extent, the relative vanatlOn m 
timekeepmg between elements WIll also affect channel dIver-
gence ObvIOusly, If the redundant channels can be made to 
sample at nearly the same tIme, channel dlvergence wlll be 
created only as a result of the vanatlOns m the samphng 
mterfaces dIscussed above ThIS can be accomphshed WIthout 
resort to cross commumcation between channels Each 
redundant element can be glVen access to a redundant clock 
whose time data enter the system m exactly the same way 
as any sensed vanable If the redundant eler.1ents are pro-
grammed such that state vanables are to be sampled at each 
50-ms boundary and If the latency of the redundant tIme 
data IS small, It can be shown that the samplmg tune of the 
redundant elements can be made to approXlmately converge 
The comcidence of the samplmg would depend solely on the 
uncertamty m each element of the actual value of tIme 
Controllmg hme Will ehmmate the dnft of time between 
computers for 10ng-duratlOn mlSSlons The applicahon pro-
grams would return to bemg frame-hased However, the 
redundant elements are shll mdependent enhhes Channel 
dIvergence IS slgmficantly decreased and the use of asympto-
hcally stable controllers IS still requued 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
A workmg example of a UFTCS system has been con-
figured and tested at NASA Ames Research Center It IS a 
mIcroprocessor-based, quadraplex-redundant control system 
configured WIth mdependently operated redundant elements 
Samplmg hmes were dehberately made highly asynchronous 
WIth cycle times of the apphcahon program bemg data dnven 
and varymg from 35 to 52 ms Total real-hme control of all 
four axes of a UH-IH hehcopter IS proVlded both m sunula-
hon and fught test 
Laboratory and manned slmulatlOn testmg of the deVlce 
have proven hIghly successful Several hundred SImulated 
"flight" hours have been logged to date The four channels 
have demonstrated acceptable, votable levels of channel 
dIvergence FIgure 10 shows an expanded VIew of the four 
redundant controls for the pedal aXlS dunng 18 sec of a 
500-sec fhght m the manned fhght SImulator The votmg 
algonthm employed was a verSlOn of mId value select The 
control theory employed was that descnbed by Meyer and 
Clcolam m reference 6 As can be seen, the redundant 
control values generated remam well wlth 0 05 0 of each 
other Over the entue fught, and other fughts, the redun-
dantly generated control values for each of the four axes 
remam wlthm 0 10 of bemg conSIstent DetaIled mformatlOn 
concermng the test system structure and operatlOn IS the 
subject of a followmg report 
Calculated Rehablhty of the Test System 
A detaIled rehablhty analYSIS of the UFTCS structure 
was conducted by Curry/Frey of Search Technology and 
VanderVelde of MIT (ref 10) The hardware developed for 
the test system was used as a model, and the study con-
SIdered potenhal configuratlOns combmmg quadruplet, 
pentad, and hexad members Votmg phllosophies conSIdered 
that SImple voters would allow the system to fall to two 
operatmg, and "smart" voters could allow the system to fall 
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FIgure 10 - UH-IH yaw control valves 
The results of the analysIs show that the probabIlIty of 
system faIlure for the first 10 hr of a helIcopter flIght USIng 
a pentad UFTCS (excludIng the unrelIabIlIty of sensors and 
actuatIOn hydraulIcs) WIth SImple voters IS 8 6X 10-1 I The 
system IS based on mIcrocomputer technology With the total 
volume of a pentad UFTCS controller beIng less than a small 
sUItcase, WIth the elements dlspersable throughout the con-
trolled enVIronment In the au-transport enVironment, 
under the same condItIons, the probability of system faIlure 
IS 2 9X 10-11 In space applIcatIOns, such as the Space 
StatIOn, the two week unattended probabilIty of faIlure IS 
2 4X 10-7 As the system con tams VIrtually no common 
elements and IS not subject to latent common deSIgn failure, 
the delIvered relIabilIty of a UFTCS system should approach 
the calculated figures 
CONCLUSIONS 
Fault-tolerant control systems can be configured from 
mdependent, autonomous, redundant elements Made from 
diSSimilar hardware, proceSSIng different verSIOns of applI-
catIon programs, and controllIng system-fault status through 
the use of statIc redundancy management, these systems 
assume the property of ultrarelIabilIty Systems so structured 
do not possess sources of latent common-desIgn faults, 
and theIr demonstrated field relIabIlIty WIll approach pre-
dIcted system relIabIlIty 
Channel dIvergence normally encountered In fault-tolerant 
systems usmg Independent redundant elements IS caused by 
samplIng and tIme dIfferences between channels and the 
use of Integral control theory Based on expenmental eVi-
dence, channel dIvergence can be decreased to levels whIch 
readily voted through (1) the use of asymptotIcally stable 
control laws, (2) samplmg rates WhICh are adequately rapId 
relatIve to the frequency response of the total system, and 
(3) forCIng samplIng tImes to converge 
Ames Research Center 
NatIOnal AeronautICS and Space AdmmistratlOn 
Moffett FIeld, CalIfornia, 94035, August 22, 1984 
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